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The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference –  
A Model-Theoretic Approach 





The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain 
knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process 
from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference 
(Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference 
to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the 
premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic 
significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to enlarge his knowledge, and 
this significance can be accounted in model-theoretic terms. I will argue first 
that the paradox is based on an equivocation, namely, it arises because 
logical containment, i.e., logical implication, is identified with 
epistemological containment, i.e., the knowledge of the premises entails the 
knowledge of the conclusion. Second, I will argue that a truth-conditional 
theory of meaning has the necessary resources to explain the epistemic 
significance of valid inferences. I will explain this epistemic significance 
starting from Carnap’s semantic theory of meaning and Tarski’s notion of 
satisfaction. In this way I will counter (Prawitz 2012b)’s claim that a 
truth-conditional theory of meaning is not able to account the legitimacy of 
valid inferences, i.e., their epistemic significance.  
The paper has five sections. I will start by presenting the paradox of 
inference, according to which a valid inference has no epistemic usefulness, 
and I will argue that we can dismiss it once we realize that it is based on an 
equivocation. In the second section I will show why we can gain knowledge 
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by performing valid inferences, and I will argue following (Prawitz 2012a) 
that we should make a distinction between stating an argument and 
performing an inference. In the third section, I will present Prawitz’s 
constructivist account to the legitimacy of valid inference, i.e., to their 
epistemic significance, and his arguments for the idea that a 
truth-conditional theory of meaning does not have the necessary resources to 
account this epistemic significance. Starting from Carnap’s semantic views 
on meaning, I will show in the fourth section how we can explain the 
epistemic significance of valid inference from a model-theoretic perspective, 
and more precisely, by using a truth-conditional theory of meaning. In the 
fifth section, by introducing Tarski’s notion of satisfaction, I will briefly 
indicate why the account is also sound for the inferences involving 
quantifiers. Finally, I will conclude by stating the conditions under which an 
agent can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and by arguing that, in 
order to acquire the piece of knowledge expressed by the conclusion of an 




2. The Paradox of Inference 
 
An explicit presentation of the so-called paradox of inference can be 
found in M. Cohen & E. Nagel’s book An Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method, namely:  
 
If in an inference the conclusion is not contained in the 
premise, it cannot be valid; and if the conclusion is not 
different from the premises, it is useless; but the conclusion 
cannot be contained in the premises and also possess novelty; 
hence inferences cannot be both valid and useful (Cohen & 
Nagel 1936/1998, 173). 
 
If we translate the conclusion of this paradox in modal terms, what it 
tells us is that it is logically impossible for an inference to be valid and useful 
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in the same time. We may obtain a clear-cut representation of this idea if we 
reconstruct the argument in a slightly different way, as follows: 
 
P1. If an inference is valid then the conclusion is contained in the 
premises. 
P2. If an inference is useful then the conclusion is different from the 
premises. 
P3. The conclusion cannot be contained in the premises and also 
different from them. 
C. Inferences cannot be both valid and useful.  
  
The paradox is meant to be a criticism to the value of formal logic, 
but, as Cohen and Nagel mention, it is based upon several confusions1. What 
does it mean to say that the conclusion “is contained” in the premises, or that 
it possesses “novelty” with respect to the premises? Clearly, as the authors 
emphasize, for a certain person, “a conclusion may be surprising or 
unexpected even though it is correctly implied by the premises” (Idem, 174). 
For instance, a theorem in Euclidean geometry may have no novelty for a 
teacher who has proved it several times before, but, certainly, a student who 
approaches the subject for the first time, by proving it, may encounter a 
psychological novelty, i.e., “a feeling of novelty” (Idem, 176). Nevertheless, 
this feature has nothing to do with the validity of an inference. The theorem 
in question necessarily follows from the axioms independently from the 
persons who inquire Euclidean geometry. This fact shows us that 
psychological novelty and logical novelty, i.e., logical independence among 
propositions2, should be distinguished. Moreover, the term “containment” is 
taken by the authors, correctly I think, to denote the relation of logical 
implication, and, since in a valid argument the conclusion is implied by the 
premises, the conclusion cannot possess logical novelty with respect to the 
premises, i.e., it is not logically independent from them. In addition, since 
the relation of implication is an objective relation that is established among 
propositions, it follows that implications can only be discovered. As a 
                                                            
1  For this disscusion you may also read the section “Deduction and Novelty” from (Cohen 
1944/1965, 25-28). 
2  Two propositions are logically independent if, and only if, the truth-value of one of them 
in no way determines or limits the truth-value of the other. (see also Cohen & Nagel 
1936/1998, 52-57). 
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consequence, logical novelty, in contradistinction to psychological novelty, 
is also an objective feature of a proposition with respect to others. Cohen and 
Nagel consider that psychological novelty, the mark of usefulness, arises 
because the conventional3 meaning of a proposition, implied by a set of 
propositions, may not be present to the reasoner’s mind, although, from an 
objective point of view the propositions are logically connected. 
Consequently, the conclusion of the paradox may be dismissed.  
Although I agree that the terms “containment”, “novelty”, and 
“usefulness” are used in a quite vague manner in the original formulation of 
the paradox, given the fact that valid inferences are essentially used in 
epistemic contexts, I think that we should take the terms “novelty” and 
“usefulness” as aiming to epistemic novelty and epistemic usefulness. In 
addition, since an inferred theorem may be new not just for a particular 
person but for the entire scientific community, the concept of novelty must 
be thought of as an epistemological concept. Moreover, and most 
importantly, by making an inference we are expecting to get a justification 
for the inferred proposition, which, no doubt, is an essential feature of 
epistemic contexts. Therefore, the main point of the argument is that the 
conclusion of a valid inference cannot possess epistemic novelty with 
respect to its premises, and, consequently, inferences do not have any 
epistemic usefulness.  
In order to have a clear-cut understanding of the so-called paradox of 
inference, I consider that it is necessary to offer explicit definitions of the 
central terms involved in its formulation. Namely, we should clearly 
distinguish between logical containment and epistemological containment, 
and between logical novelty and epistemological novelty. In order to make 
explicit these concepts I propose the following four definitions:  
 
Definition 1 Logical Containment: A proposition P is logically contained in 
a set of propositions Γ if and only if Γ logically implies P.  
                                                            
3  The authors distinguish between the conventional meaning of a proposition and the 
propositions it implies. The conventional meaning is defined as “that minimum of meaning 
which is required if a group of inquirers can be said to address themselves to the same 
proposition” (Idem, 176). The conventional meaning of a proposition enlarges when we 
discover a new logical consequence of this proposition. Initially, the meaning of this new 
proposition was not part of the conventional meaning of the initial proposition. Given my 
interpretation of the paradox, I think that this conventional meaning should be identified with 
the known associated meaning with a sentence, at a certain moment of time.  
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Definition 2 Logical Novelty: A proposition P has logical novelty with 
respect to a set of propositions Γ if and only if Γ and P are logically 
independent. 
Definition 3 Epistemological Containment: A proposition P is 
epistemologically contained4 in a set of propositions Γ, relative to a 
person A if and only if by knowing Γ then the person, ipso facto, 
knows P.  
Definition 4 Epistemological Novelty: A proposition P has epistemological 
novelty for a person A relative to a set of propositions Γ, if, and only 
if, A knows Γ without knowing, ipso facto, P. 
  
These definitions allow us to understand more clearly why an 
inference can be both valid and useful or, in other words, to see why logical 
containment and epistemological novelty are compatible. The compatibility 
becomes evident once we realize that the paradox, as I strongly believe, is 
based on an equivocation, namely, logical containment is identified with 
epistemological containment. This compatibility can be easily made explicit, 
in several steps of reasoning, in the following manner: if logical containment 
implies epistemological containment, then a person who knows a 
proposition also knows all its consequences. However, it is a fact that a real 
person may know a proposition without knowing all its consequences. 
Hence, logical containment does not imply epistemological containment. 
Moreover, epistemological containment is equivalent to epistemological 
non-novelty. This means that logical containment does not imply 
epistemological non-novelty. Therefore, logical containment and 
epistemological novelty are logically compatible.  
If we want, for precision, we may represent more explicitly this 
reasoning as follows:  
 
(A)  If logical containment implies epistemological containment, then a 
person who knows a proposition also knows all its consequences. 
(Def.1 and Def.4) 
                                                            
4 If we want, we may label the concept of epistemological containment with the term of 
“epistemological consequence”, i.e., a proposition is an epistemological consequence of a 
set of propositions, relative to an agent state of knowledge, if it is epistemologically 
contained in them. Of course, according to definition 3, Γ may logically imply P, or it may 
not imply it. 
Constantin C. Brîncuş  
16 
(B)  A person may know a proposition without knowing all its 
consequences. (Description of a fact.) 
(C)  Logical containment does not imply epistemological containment. 
(MT –A, B) 
(D)  Epistemological containment is equivalent to epistemological 
non-novelty. (Def.3 and Def.4) 
(E) Logical containment does not imply epistemological non-novelty. (C, 
D) 
(F)  Logical containment and epistemological novelty are compatible. (E)  
 
The distinction between logical novelty and epistemological novelty 
is also important. The generally accepted idea is that we can obtain a new 
piece of knowledge only from experience. However, this is not necessarily 
the case. Of course, if a proposition has empirical content and is logically 
independent from what we already know, we cannot infer it from what we 
know. In this case we may obtain a justification for it only by appealing to 
experience. Nevertheless, we may also gain new knowledge by way of 
deductive thinking, as I will argue below. Therefore, not all that is 
epistemologically novel is logically novel.  
 With these distinctions in mind we can now defuse the so-called 
paradox of inference: if an inference is valid then the conclusion is logically 
contained in the premises. If an inference is useful then the conclusion must 
have epistemological novelty with respect to the premises. But, the 
conclusion can be logically contained in the premises and also possess 
epistemological novelty. Consequently, inferences can be both valid and 
useful, i.e., it is logically possible for an inference to be both valid and 
useful.  
The distinction formulated above between logical containment, i.e., 
logical implication, and epistemological containment, i.e., epistemological 
consequence, can be found in a slightly different way in (Fine 2007, 47-48). 
K. Fine distinguishes between classical consequence and manifest 
consequence. The point is that although a proposition may be a classical 
consequence of a set of propositions it is not necessarily a manifest 
consequence of them. According to Fine’s definition, a proposition q is a 
manifest consequence of other propositions p1, p2, ,..., pn if it is a classical 
consequence of them and if, in addition, it would be manifest to any ideal 
cognizer who knew the propositions p1, p2, ,..., pn, that q was indeed a 
classical consequence of those propositions.  
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The fact that these two concepts do not overlap is indicated by K. 
Fine by way of a very simple example. We can imagine an ideal cognitive 
agent who is perfectly competent in drawing consequences from what he 
knows, and we may ask ourselves if he will know every classical 
consequence of what he already knows. More precisely, let us consider the 
agent A who knows that Paderewski is a brilliant pianist (having heard him 
at a concert), and who also knows that he is a charismatic statesman (having 
heard him at a political rally), but who does not realize that is the same 
person who is both. Therefore, the agent A knows that p is P, and he also 
knows, from another context, that p is S, but the agent A is not in the 
position to know that p is both P and S. In other words, although (x)(Px & 
Sx) is a classical consequence of Pp and Sp, the agent knows Pp and Sp 
without knowing (x)(Px & Sx). If we use the epistemic operator `KA_`, i.e., 
A knows _, and let the sign “├” denote the relation of manifest consequence, 
we may write:  
 
KA Pp, KA Sp├ KA(x)(Px & Sx) 
  
Having in mind this example, we may believe that, in order to know 
the conclusion, the agent must have some extra, empirical, knowledge. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, what the agent may 
need is simply coordinating his thoughts in order to realize that Paderewski 
the pianist is the same person with Paderewski the statesman. Of course, this 
example may raise further questions, but they lie beyond the scope of the 
present paper. We can make a clear-cut distinction between logical 
containment and epistemological containment without entering in mental 
considerations, as we will see below.  
 
 
3. Knowledge Through Inference 
 
The idea that logical containment, i.e., logical implication, and 
epistemological containment do not overlap can be illustrated by more 
simple and frequent situations. For instance, let us consider the following 
argument for which we assume that the premises are in fact true:  
  
If the safe was opened, it must have been opened by Smith, 
with the assistance of Brown or Robinson. None of these 
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three could have been involved unless he was absent from the 
meeting. But we know that either Smith or Brown was 
present at the meeting. So since the safe was opened, it must 
have been Robinson who helped open it. (Forbes 1994, 86) 
 
No doubt, this argument is logically valid, i.e., the premises logically 
imply the conclusion, but, certainly, an untrained detective may know that 
each premise in part is true without recognizing, ipso facto, the truth of the 
conclusion. Speaking more generally, when there is an epistemic gap, 
sufficiently wide, between the premises and the conclusion of a valid 
argument, the person in question must make an epistemic effort – which 
remains to be explained – in order to be able to assert the conclusion. 
Probably the best example which enforces the distinction between logical 
containment and epistemological containment is that of an argument which 
has as premises the axioms of a theory and as conclusion a certain theorem 
of that theory5. In this case, although the conclusion follows from the 
axioms, certainly we may not be able to infer it. If this would not be so, then 
a person who knows the axioms of a theory will also know, ipso facto, each 
theorem of that theory. But certainly, this is not the case. Logical 
omniscience is not a feature of the actual human minds.  
If we introduce again the epistemic operator ‘KA_’ we may consider 
the following two propositions (Rescher 2005, 14-15): 
 
(A) If KA p and KA (p├ q), then KA q. 
(B) If KA p and p├ q, then KA q, or, equivalently, if p├ q, then KA p ├ KA q,  
 
I think that we all agree that although the proposition (A) is true, 
proposition (B) needs a supplementary condition in the antecedent in order 
to be true, i.e.: (B’) If KA p and p├ q, and … , then KA q. I think that the 
additional condition that should be introduced is the following: agent A 
infers6 q from p. In this case, if we reconsider the argument stated above, in 
                                                            
5 This example is also used by Dag Prawitz (2012a, 890; 2012b, 11) in order to illustrate that 
the Tarskian semantic notion of validity is insufficient for explaining the epistemic 
significance of valid inferences.  
6  By “agent A infers q from p” I mean “agent A correctly (or validly) infers q from p” since, 
as far as I understand these terms, an agent who does not correctly infer a proposition from 
a set of propositions, basically, he does not infer it.  
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order to get in possession of the piece of knowledge expressed by the 
conclusion, an agent must infer the conclusion from the premises. In other 
words, he must supplement the premises with the following steps of 
inference (I1, I4): 
 
P1. If the safe was opened, it must have been opened by Smith, with 
the assistance of Brown or Robinson. 
P2. None of these three could have been involved unless he was 
absent from the meeting. 
P3. Either Smith or Brown was present at the meeting. 
P4. The safe was opened. 
I1. Smith opened the safe and either Brown or Robinson helped. 
(from P4 and P1) 
I2. Smith was absent from the meeting. (from I1 and P2)  
I3. Brown was present at the meeting. (from I2 and P3) 
I4. Brown did not help to open the safe. (from I3 and P2) 
C. Robinson helped open the safe. (from I4 and I1). (see also Forbes 
1994, 87) 
 
In sum, the agent gets a justification for asserting the proposition 
expressed by the conclusion only if he performs the inferences I1-I4. By 
simply asserting P1 –P4 and then C, the agent does not have any real 
justification in order to assert the proposition expressed by the conclusion C. 
Generalizing from this individual case, we can say that although a 
proposition is logically implied by a set of true propositions, i.e., it is 
logically contained in them, an agent does not know the proposition 
expressed by the conclusion if he is not able to infer it from the premises. 
We can say, following (Prawitz 2012a), that stating an argument and making 
an inference are two quite different things. To make an inference means to 
assert the premises and then to infer the conclusion from the premises. To 
state an argument means just to assert the premises and the conclusion, and 
claiming the existence of a certain relation between them (A, B. Hence C.).  
Returning to our initial problem, i.e., whether we can gain knowledge 
through valid inferences, now we can definitely give an affirmative answer. 
As we saw, a proposition may be logically implied by a set of propositions 
without entailing, by itself, that an agent who knows that set of propositions, 
ipso facto, knows each proposition logically implied by them, i.e., in our 
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initial terms, logical containment does not entail epistemological 
containment. In order to entail epistemological containment, logical 
containment must be supplemented with the condition imposed on a real 
agent, namely, to realize the necessary acts of inference. The epistemic effort 
that we have mentioned above consists precisely in performing these acts.  
In the following sections it remains to explain why the relation of 
logical implication in addition with the acts of inference may entail 
epistemological containment. Dag Prawitz (2012a) proposed an explanation 
of the epistemic significance of valid inferences from a constructivist point 
of view, and he argued (in Prawitz 2012b) that a truth-conditional theory of 
meaning does not have the necessary resources to explain the legitimacy of 
inferences, i.e., their epistemic significance. The main aim of the next 
sections is to account for the epistemic significance of valid inferences from 
a model-theoretic point of view, and more precisely, by using a 
truth-conditional theory of meaning. 
 
 
4. The Legitimacy of Inferences  
 
The problem of accounting for the epistemic significance of valid 
inferences presupposes an explanation of the fact that an agent who knows7 
the true propositions expressed by the premises of a valid argument, and 
performs a chain of inferences from the premises that leads him to the 
conclusion, will, ipso facto, know the proposition expressed by the 
conclusion. A necessary condition for grasping the piece of knowledge 
expressed by the conclusion is, of course, that the agent understands the 
meanings of the sentences involved in the stated argument, i.e., the 
propositions that they express. Consequently, for explaining the proposed 
problem we must state an adequate theory of meaning which allows us to 
explain how an agent may gain sometimes new knowledge by using valid 
inferences. This fact indicates us the real importance of a theory of meaning 
and its central place in philosophical approaches. 
                                                            
7  The concept of knowledge engaged in this approach is such that an agent knows a 
proposition if that proposition is true and the agent has a justification that guarantees the 
truth of that proposition. 
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One of the most important philosophers who vividly recognized the 
importance of the theory of meaning in analysing philosophical issues was 
Rudolf Carnap. Although he initially reduced philosophy to the logic of 
science, and more precisely to the syntax of the language of science (Carnap 
1937, 277-280), he soon realized that  
 
many philosophers and scientists interested in the logical 
analysis of science have become aware that we need, in 
addition to a purely formal analysis of language, an analysis 
of the signifying function of language – in other words, a 
theory of meaning and interpretation. (Carnap 1942, v).  
 
Consequently, he redefined the task of philosophy as consisting in 
semiotic analysis. i.e., syntactic, semantic and pragmatic analyses. (Carnap 
1942, 250). The theory of meaning developed by Carnap, as we will see 
below, is a truth-conditional theory of meaning.  
Michael Dummett is another important philosopher who recognized 
the importance of a theory of meaning in philosophy. He considered that a 
meaning-theoretical investigation is the only way that we can clarify, 
roughly speaking, philosophical problems. In fact, he turned this idea into a 
general philosophical program meant to settle the debate between Realism 
and Anti-realism (see also Prawitz 2012b). However, the theory of 
meaning developed by Dummett, in relative opposition to the 
truth-conditional theory of meaning as I will try to argue below, is a 
proof-conditional theory of meaning. 
The main assumption of Dummett’s meaning-theoretical approach is 
that an adequate theory of meaning should account for all the features of the 
use of expressions that depend on knowing their meaning. Of course, as we 
indicated in the first part of this article, a main use of sentences which 
depends on knowing their meaning is their use in valid inferences and 
arguments. Therefore, an adequate theory of meaning must be able to 
account for this important use of sentences. In addition, since an important, 
and probably the most important, use of valid inferences is in expanding the 
knowledge of an agent or of a community, an adequate theory of meaning 
must explain this epistemic significance of valid inferences – in Prawitz’s 
words, their legitimacy.  
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 Dag Prawitz considers that a truth-conditional theory of meaning is 
not able to account for the legitimacy of inferences, and, consequently, it is 
not an adequate theory of meaning. His general argument may be 
represented in the following manner: 
 
As. A theory of meaning should account for all features of the 
use of  expressions that depend on knowing their meaning. 
P_P1.  A deductive inference is legitimate if it can be used to obtain 
knowledge, i.e., to get a conclusive ground for an assertion. 
P_P2.  The legitimacy of a deductive inference is part of our use of 
language and depends on knowing the meaning of the sentences 
involved. 
P_P3. A meaning theory must give an account of the legitimacy of 
deductive inference. (from As., P_P2.) 
P_P4. Legitimacy is not explained by a truth-conditional theory of 
meaning (T.-C.T.M.) 
P_C.  A T.-C.T.M. is an inadequate theory of meaning. (Prawitz 
2012) 
 
Prawitz’s main arguments against a truth-conditional theory of 
meaning are stated in support for the fourth premise. However, before 
exposing these specific arguments let us briefly analyse his explanation for 
the legitimacy of inferences. The main concept in his theory of meaning, 
used to explain the legitimacy of arguments, appears in the general argument 
presented above in the first premise, namely, the concept of ground. Shortly, 
an inference is legitimate if it offers to the agent who has grounds for the 
premises, and performs that inference, a ground for the conclusion. 
Essentially, in this new theory of meaning,  
 
the sense of a sentence is given in terms of how it is 
established as true, in other words, in terms of what is 
required to be justified in asserting the sentence or to have a 
ground for the assertion. (Prawitz, 2012b, 12).  
 
The concept of ground is defined as “something that one gets in 
possession of by doing certain things”. (When he speaks about grounds, 
Prawitz refers only to conclusive grounds, i.e., grounds that guarantee truth 
Meaning and Truth  
23 
(Prawitz 2012a, 890)). The real content of the term “ground” is given 
relative to the type of sentences that we analyse. A ground for an empirical 
sentence is obtained by doing an empirical action, i.e., an adequate 
observation. A ground for a non-empirical sentence is obtained by 
performing a mental action, namely, for a mathematical sentence a ground is 
obtained by performing a relevant calculation, and for a logically compound 
sentence a ground is obtained by operating on grounds for asserting its 
constituents. (Prawitz 2012a, 893). These grounds are “abstract entities that 
can be constructed in the mind” or  
 
we may think of a ground for a judgement as just a 
representation of the state of our mind when we have 
justified a judgement (Prawitz 2009, 195).  
 
By using the notion of ground, and the primitive notion of grounding 
operation, Prawitz redefines an inference as a quadruple containing 
premises, grounds for premises, a grounding operation, and conclusion. To 
make an inference means exactly to apply the grounding operation to the 
grounds for the premises. By applying the grounding operation to the 
grounds for the premises an agent obtains, ipso facto, a new ground for the 
conclusion and thereby is justified in asserting the conclusion. As a general 
remark, this theory follows Gentzen’s idea that the introduction inferences – 
or canonical inferences, in Prawitz’s terms – determine the meaning of the 
logical constants. The main difference is that the introduction inferences are 
seen as having attached grounding operations. These grounding operations 
operate on the grounds for the premises to which they are applied and 
transform them in a ground, a new ground, for the conclusion.  
To take a simple example, if a person understands the meaning of 
conjunction and has grounds for each of its conjuncts, then, in virtue of the 
meaning of conjunction, she will also have, ipso facto, a ground for the 
compound conjunctive sentence. The meaning of conjunction is explained as 
being determined by what counts as a ground for it. Of course, having a 
ground for each of its conjuncts is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
having a ground for the conjunctive sentence. More specifically, this new 
ground for the conjunctive sentence -&G(α,β)- is obtained by applying the 
conjunctive grounding operation -&G- to the grounds -α and β- for each 
conjunct. Mutatis mutandis for the other sentences formed by Gentzen’s 
introduction rules. 
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Now we may return to analyse Prawitz’s arguments for P_P4, i.e., 
“legitimacy is not explained by the T.-C.T.M”. I think that these arguments 
are essentially two, one regarding the Tarskian model-theoretic notion of 
validity, and the other regarding the idea of determining the meaning of a 
sentence by its truth-conditions.  
The first argument runs as follows: the model-theoretic notion of 
validity is defined as truth-preservation under all assignments of meaning to 
the non-logical terms from the sentences involved in an inference. However, 
an inference which has as premises the axioms of a theory and as conclusion 
an arbitrary theorem of the theory, although it is valid, if there is a 
sufficiently wide epistemic gap between the premises and the conclusion, 
then it does not offer to the agent that performs it the knowledge expressed 
by the conclusion. Therefore, validity is not a sufficient condition for 
legitimacy, and, consequently, legitimacy is not explained by a T.-C.T.M.  
The second argument emphasizes the idea that  
 
truth-conditions contain too little information to allow us to 
infer that a person who knows the meaning of a sentence also 
knows what counts as ground for asserting the sentence 
(Prawitz 2012a, 12).  
 
More specifically, the argument may also be represented as a modus 
tollens, namely: an adequate theory of meaning must show how an agent 
who (1) knows the meaning of the sentences involved in an inference, (2) is 
justified in asserting its premises, and (3) performs the inference is, ipso 
facto, justified in asserting the conclusion. Nevertheless, if the meaning of 
the sentences is given by truth-conditions then the criteria (1), (2), and (3) 
are not satisfied because an agent will not know that the proposition 
expressed by the conclusion is true without making additional inferences. 
Consequently, legitimacy is not explained by a T.-C.T.M.  
 The first argument, I think, could be easily resisted. Certainly, we 
must agree that validity by itself is not a sufficient condition for legitimacy. 
In fact, this idea was implicit in our analysis of the paradox of inference 
when we distinguished logical containment from epistemological 
containment. Without supplementing the idea of logical implication with the 
condition of inferring the conclusion of a valid argument from its premises, 
an agent could not get a justification for asserting the conclusion. However, 
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this does not imply that a T.-C.T.M. cannot explain this entire process. What 
remains to be done is to explain in truth-conditional terms why an agent who 
understands truth-conditionally the meanings of the sentences of an 
argument, knows that the premises are true, and infers the conclusion from 
them will get a justification for asserting the conclusion. Basically, we must 
explain in terms of truth-conditions why an agent who infers a conclusion 
from certain premises already known obtains a justification for the 
conclusion. This will be explained after I will introduce some insightful 
ideas from Carnap’s truth-conditional theory of meaning. In this way I think 
that we will also be able to resist Prawitz’s second argument according to 
which a truth-conditional theory of meaning is not a good candidate for 
explaining the legitimacy of inferences. 
 
 
5. Inference and Meaning via Truth-Conditions 
 
The idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its 
truth-conditions has a long standing philosophical tradition. Gottlob Frege 
was the first philosopher who systematically defined the meaning of a 
sentence in this way. Of course, this definition of meaning presupposes a 
primary understanding of the concept of truth. Nevertheless, after Alfred 
Tarski had succeeded in offering a materially adequate and formally correct 
definition of truth for a certain formal language, the truth-conditional 
definition of meaning received a powerful foundation.  
Tarski was sceptical regarding the extension of his theory of truth to 
natural languages, but Donald Davidson emphasized that the T-clauses from 
the theory of truth for a certain language could also serve as definitions for 
the meaning of the sentences from that language. In particular,  
 
the definition works by giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth 
conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. To 
know the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know 
what it is for a sentence – any sentence – to be true, and this 
amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to 
understand the language (Davidson 1967, 310).  
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However, long before Davidson, Rudolf Carnap, strongly influenced 
by Tarski’s work in semantics, had recognized the importance of Tarski’s 
definition of the semantic concept of truth for the theory of meaning. In his 
1942 book, Introduction to Semantics, Carnap makes the following assertions: 
 
By a semantical system (or interpreted system) we 
understand a system of rules, formulated in a metalanguage 
and referring to an object language, of such a kind that the 
rules determine a truth-condition for every sentence of the 
object language, i.e. a sufficient and necessary condition for 
its truth. In this way the sentences are interpreted by the 
rules, i.e., made understandable, because to understand a 
sentence, to know what is asserted by it, is the same as to 
know under what conditions it would be true. To formulate it 
in still another way: the rules determine the meaning or sense 
of the sentences. Truth and falsity are called truth-values of 
sentences. To know the truth-conditions of a sentence is (in 
most cases) much less than to know its truth-value, but it is a 
necessary starting point for finding out its truth-value 
(Carnap 1942, 22). 
  
In this passage we find again the basic idea of a truth-conditional 
theory of meaning, i.e., meaning is given by truth-conditions, and we also 
discover, as we should, that the knowledge of the truth-conditions for a 
sentence, i.e., of its meaning, is (in most cases) only a necessary condition 
for determining its truth-value. Moreover, Carnap details this general 
description by way of a very simple and useful example:  
 
Suppose that Pierre says: ‘Mon crayon est noir’ (S). Then, if 
we know French, we understand the sentence S, although we 
may not know its truth value. Our understanding of S 
consists in our knowledge of its truth-condition; we know 
that S is true if and only if a certain object, Pierre’s pencil, 
has a certain color, black. This knowledge of the 
truth-condition for S tells us what we must do in order to 
determine the truth-value of S, i.e. to find out whether S is 
true or false, what we must do in this case is to observe the 
color of Pierre’s pencil (Idem, 22-23). 
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Although we may not be justified in generalizing from this particular 
example, what is interesting is that Carnap believes that the knowledge of 
the meaning of a sentence tells us what we must do in order to determine the 
truth-value of that sentence. It is interesting because this idea allows us to 
make an analogy to Prawitz’s definition of ground, i.e., “something that one 
gets in possession of by doing certain things”. This would mean that by 
knowing the truth-conditions for a sentence, i.e., its meaning, a person will 
also know what she must do in order to obtain a ground or justification for 
that sentence, or for the assertion of the proposition expressed by that 
sentence. Of course, being an empirical sentence, “Mon crayon est noir”, 
what a person must do is to perform an adequate observation – as Prawitz 
also emphasizes when he speaks about grounds for empirical sentences. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that by knowing the truth-conditions for a 
sentence we will also know what counts as a ground for it. We may 
understand very well a sentence without knowing exactly what would 
constitute a ground for asserting it. For instance, we understand Goldbach’s 
conjecture but we do not know what specifically we must do in order to 
obtain a ground for it. As a consequence, we may have doubts regarding 
Prawitz’s idea that to understand a sentence means to know what counts as a 
ground for asserting it.  
Going further, what do the truth-conditions for a logically compound 
sentence tell us? To answer this question, it is helpful to briefly analyse 
Carnap’s semantic view for the logical operators. In this respect, we can take 
into account a short description from Carnap’s 1958 book, Introduction to 
Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, namely: 
 
What the truth table of a connective gives is primarily a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a 
compound so connected, in terms of the truth-values of its 
members. Suppose that a person knows the sense of the 
sentences ‘A’ and ‘B’, where perhaps ‘A’ says that it is (now, 
in Paris) snowing and ‘B’ says that it is raining; and suppose 
that no translation of ‘v’ has been given him, but only the 
truth-table. Can the person comprehend the meaning of the 
sentence ‘A v B’ so that (a) he knows when it is permissible 
to assert this compound on the basis of his factual 
information; and (b) he can extract from a communication 
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having the form of this compound the factual information 
being communicated? The answer is: he can. Perceiving from 
the NTT that the compound holds in the first three cases but 
not in the last, our subject knows precisely the conditions 
under which the compound sentence may be asserted and he 
knows precisely what information it conveys as a 
communication. […] He knows that the compound may not 
be asserted if indications are it is neither snowing nor raining. 
[…] The remarks support a general statement: a knowledge 
of the truth-conditions of a sentence is identical with an 
understanding of its meaning (Carnap 1958, 14-15). 
 
The problem to which I think that Prawitz hints when he says that the 
“truth-conditions contain too little information to allow us to infer that a 
person who knows the meaning of a sentence also knows what counts as 
ground for asserting the sentence” is the problem of justification. A person 
who understands the premises of an inference, knows that they are true, and 
correctly infers a certain conclusion from them, will know that the 
conclusion is also true – logical consequence being necessarily 
truth-preserving. But, is the person justified in asserting the truth of the 
proposition expressed by the conclusion? 
Prawitz’s proposal – which I find very interesting – was to reconsider 
and to enlarge the definition of an inference by adding to its structure two 
new elements, namely, grounds and a grounding operation corresponding to 
Gentzen’s introduction inferences (Prawitz 2009, 195). Nevertheless, do we 
really need these new elements in order to explain the preservation of 
justification when passing correctly from the premises to the conclusion of 
an inference? I think that they are not necessary, and that a truth-conditional 
theory of meaning handles the situation. Since inferences are valid in virtue 
of the meanings of the logical constants from their structure, I think that 
there must be a connection between the meaning of the logical constants and 
justification, and this is why the ideas expressed by Carnap are very useful 
regarding this issue.  
Essentially, one main idea here is that the meaning of the logical 
operators is what makes an inference valid8. An inference is necessarily 
                                                            
8 The converse relation, that the rules of inference -or certain rules of inference- determine 
the meanings of the logical operators, i.e., the inferentialist thesis, is not engaged in this 
approach. 
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truth-preserving in virtue of the invariant meanings of the logical operators in 
all the valuations of the non-logical expressions of that inference, i.e., the 
meaning of the logical operators indicates us a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the truth-value of the compound sentences formed with their 
help, and this is an essential feature for explaining the preservation of truth. 
For instance, let us consider the inferences from Gentzen’s natural deduction 
system for propositional logic, which is sound and complete. Gentzen 
considers the introduction inferences as determining the meaning of the 
logical operators. However, if we do not conceive the introduction inferences 
as evidently valid, and ask why the introduction inferences are valid, the 
intuitive answer that we may give is that these rules are valid in virtue of the 
meanings of the logical operators that they introduce. In general, a formal 
system of logic – or a logical calculus – is meant to formalize, or to represent, 
a system of logic, i.e. a semantic system. This is precisely why a full 
formalization of logic consists in constructing a formal system which 
formalizes, in addition to logical truth and logical consequence, all the logical 
properties of the logical operators (Carnap 1943, 96). 
Since the meaning of a propositional logical operator indicates -as 
Carnap emphasizes- a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth-value of 
the compound sentences formed with its help, this means that a person who 
knows the truth-values of the simple sentences and understands the meaning 
of the logical operators, will also know the truth-value of a compound 
sentence inferred by using the rules of inference that introduce its operators. 
Of course, in order to know the truth-values of the simple sentences from 
which a compound sentence is inferred, a person must possess a justification 
that guarantees the truth-value of those simple sentences. But, again, is a 
person who knows the premises of a valid argument and infers a conclusion 
from them, justified in asserting that conclusion? 
I think that she is justified. One main feature of the truth-conditional 
theory of meaning that is also implicitly present in Carnap’s description is 
compositionality, i.e., the meaning of a compound sentence is given by the 
meanings of its constituents (together with the structure of the sentence). 
More specifically, if an agent knows the truth-conditions for the simple 
sentences that form a compound sentence and understands the meaning of 
the logical operators – as they are given by the normal truth-tables (NTT) – 
then he will also know the truth-conditions for the compound sentence 
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formed by those operators. As a consequence, and this is the main idea, by 
knowing the truth conditions for the logically compound sentence, the agent 
will know in which conditions it is permissible to assert the compound 
sentence, i.e., he will know when he is justified in asserting the proposition 
expressed by the compound sentence. Hence, the knowledge of the truth of 
the premises, i.e., of the fulfilment of their truth conditions, together with the 
knowledge of the meaning of the logical constants are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an agent to be justified in asserting the proposition 
in question. This is what I think that Carnap refers to when he says that the 
agent “knows when it is permissible to assert” the compound sentence on the 
basis of the factual information from which he/she infers it.  
The idea that there is a strong connection between truth-conditions 
and justification was implicitly present also in Frege’s approach to 
inferences. Frege believed that the transitions between the premises and 
conclusion in derivations must have three properties, namely: (a) the 
transitions must be truth-preserving, (b) the premises must justify the 
conclusion, and (c) each transition must be immediately evident (Peacocke 
1992, 799-800). Frege did not develop a detailed philosophical account to 
the relation of justification but Peacocke considers that in the Fregean 
conception the following account seems natural:  
 
one formula of Grundgesetze justifies a second if the 
truth-conditions for first, as determined by Frege’s stipulations, 
guarantees fulfilment of the truth conditions for the second, as 
determined by stipulations (Peacocke 1992, 799-800).  
 
To sum up, and to answer the proposed question, by knowing the 
truth-conditions for the logically compound sentences, an agent will know in 
which conditions it is justified to assert the proposition expressed by that 
compound sentence. In addition, if the agent has justifications which 
guarantee the truth of the propositions expressed by the sentences from 
which the compound sentence is inferred9, then he will also have a 
justification for asserting the proposition expressed by the compound 
                                                            
9  It is important to emphasize that an inference is not necessarily a proof-theoretical 
instrument. To perform an inference means to transform some propositions into another 
proposition according to certain rules of inference.  
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sentence. More specifically, if a person (1) knows truth-conditionally the 
meaning of the sentences involved in an inference, (2) is justified in 
asserting its premises, and (3) performs the inference then he/she is, ipso 
facto, justified in asserting the conclusion. The validity of this argument will 
be explicitly explained in the last section.  
 
 
6. Inferences Involving Quantifiers 
 
The idea that an act of inference may have an epistemic function, 
which can be explained in truth-conditional terms, could also be instantiated 
on the inferences involving quantifiers. What we must show is that the 
meaning of a sentence involving quantifiers is compositional, and that by 
inferring quantified sentences from sentences for which we have 
justifications we get in possession of a justification for the inferred sentence. 
The central notion that allows us to see why these two conditions are 
fulfilled is the notion of satisfaction. This is the central notion of the 
Tarskian semantics for the predicate language. Since we cannot directly 
assign a truth-value to the atomic sentences containing free variables from 
the predicate logic, a quantified sentence is not a truth function of the 
truth-values of its components. Nevertheless, with the help of the notion of 
satisfaction we can define the truth-value for this sentences. Without 
entering in details, roughly, an open sentence with n-free variables is true if 
and only if it is satisfied by a sequence of objects. This propositional 
function is satisfied by a sequence of objects if and only if the first n-objects 
from the sequence instantiate the property expressed by the predicate10.  
Having in mind these features, we may now analyse the two 
quantified sentences inferred from atomic sentences with the help of two 
basic introduction inferences from Gentzen’s natural deduction system for 
predicate calculus. If we know the satisfaction conditions for the premises 
and we understand the meaning of the logical quantifiers, then we also know 
the satisfaction conditions for the quantified sentences. Furthermore, in 
addition to the understanding of the meaning of the atomic sentences and 
quantifiers, if we know that the propositional function is in fact satisfied, 
                                                            
10  For some basic insight of the Tarskian semantics the reading of (Taylor 1998, 113-145) 
could be useful. 
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then we will also know that the quantified sentence inferred from it is 
satisfied. In essence, if we understand the meaning of the quantifiers and we 
are justified in asserting the propositional functions to which they apply, 
then we will also be justified in asserting the quantified sentences formed by 
applying the quantifiers to the propositional functions. The knowledge of the 
meanings of the quantifiers tells us in which conditions we are justified to 
assert a quantified sentence. We can simply describe the situation as follows:  
 
a)  A(t)  b)  A(t)  
 (x)A(x)  (x)A(x)  
a) If we know the satisfaction-conditions (S-C) for the propositional 
function A(x1), and we know that the propositional function is satisfied, 
then, in virtue of the meaning of ‘’, we will also know that the proposition 
(x)A(x1) is satisfied. The propositional function A(x1) is satisfied (SAT) by 
a sequence of objects (Σ) <a1, a2, ,..., an> iff a1 satisfies x1.  
SAT [Σ, A(x 1)] iff a1 has the property A. 
SAT [Σ, (x)A(x)] iff (for any sequence Σ*~i Σ)11 (SAT [Σ*, A(x 1)]) 
b) If we know the satisfaction-conditions (S-C) for the propositional 
function A(x1) and we know that the propositional function is satisfied, then, 
in virtue of the meaning of ‘’, we will also know the S-C for (x)A(x1). 
The propositional function A(x1) is satisfied by a sequence of objects < a1, a2, 
,..., an> iff a1 satisfies x1.  
SAT [Σ, A(x 1)] iff a1 has the property A. 
SAT [Σ, (x)A(x 1)] iff (there is a sequence Σ*~i Σ)(SAT [Σ*, A(x 1)]) 
  
The idea that these inferences are legitimate, i.e., they have an 
epistemic function, is explained by D. Prawitz in the same manner as for the 
propositional inferences, with the help of the notions of ground and 
grounding operations, and, in addition, as for the inferences involving 
assumptions, by operating the distinction between saturated and unsaturated 
grounds. You may find below a short exemplification but for more details 
see (Prawitz 2009, 193-194).  
 
a)  A(t)  b)  A(t)  
 (x)A(x)   (x)A(x)  
                                                            
11  For any sequence of objects Σ* differing from Σ in at most the i-th place.  
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a) If we have a ground for the propositional function A(x1, x2 ,..., xn), 
then, in virtue of the meaning of ‘’, we will also have a ground for (x1, x2 
,..., xn) A(x1, x2, ,..., xn). A ground for propositional function A(x1, x2, ,..., xn) 
is an unsaturated ground α(x1, x2, ,..., xn) such that for individuals a1, a2, ,..., an 
in the domain in question α(a1, a2, ,..., an) is a ground for the assertion A(t1, t2, 
,..., tn), where ti denotes ai. The ground for (x)A(x) is formed by applying 
the grounding operation G to the ground α(x).  
b) If we have a ground for the propositional function A(x1), then, in 
virtue of the meaning of ‘’, we will also have a ground for (x1)A(x1). A 
ground for propositional function A(x1) is an unsaturated ground α(x1) such 
that for individuals a1, a2, ,..., an in the domain in question α(ai,) is a ground 
for the assertion A(t1, t2, ,..., tn), where ti denotes ai. The ground for (x)A(x) 
is formed by applying the grounding operation G to the ground α(x). 
 
 
7. Final Remarks 
 
I have argued that valid inferences have an epistemic function, and 
that this function can be explained in model-theoretic terms, and more 
precisely, in truth-conditional terms. As we have seen before, by performing 
a valid inference from premises for which an agent already has justifications 
which guarantee their truth, the agent may obtain a justification for the truth 
of the proposition expressed by the conclusion of the performed inference. 
The argument which endorses the epistemic significance of valid inferences 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
ES_P1: There is a valid inference from P1, P2,…, Pn to C. 
ES_P2: The agent A has justifications for the premises P1, P2,…, Pn. 
ES_P3: The agent performs the inference, and knows that it is valid.  
ES_C: The agent obtains a justification for asserting the proposition 
expressed by C.  
 
The explication of the validity of this argument may run as follows: 
since C is logically implied by P1, P2,…, Pn, i.e., is a logical consequence of 
them, the truth of the premises – by definition – is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the truth of the conclusion, i.e., it guarantees the truth of C. In 
addition, by inferring C from P1, P2,…, Pn by means of valid inferences, 
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known by the agent to be valid, the agent knows that C is a logical 
consequence of P1, P2,…, Pn. Consequently, he will know that if P1, P2,…, 
Pn are true then C is also true, i.e., the truth of the premises guarantees the 
truth of the conclusion. Of course, the agent may know that the truth of P1, 
P2,…, Pn guarantees the truth of C without having actually any justification 
for P1, P2,…, Pn. Nevertheless, if P1, P2,…, Pn are true then so is C. As a 
consequence, if the agent obtains a justification which guarantees the truth of 
the premises, then the knowledge of the truth of the premises and of the 
meanings of the logical constants from the inference performed, will justify 
the agent in asserting the truth of the conclusion.  
 The second conjunct of the premise 3, i.e., the agent knows that the 
inference is valid, is declined by Dag Prawitz as a necessary condition for 
explaining the legitimacy of valid inferences because “we do not normally 
establish the validity of an inference before we use it” (Prawitz 2009, 184). 
If this condition would be necessary, Prawitz argues, then a regress would 
result, namely, in order to establish the validity of the inference we would 
need an argument which establishes its validity, and then another argument 
for the validity of the previous argument and so on. However, I think that we 
can stop this regress because, as we have seen in section four, we know the 
validity of inferences in virtue of the meaning of the logical operators from 
their structure.  
According to Prawitz, an agent gets a ground for the conclusion of an 
inference by performing it – in the sense defined in section 3 –, and “if the 
inference she has made is valid, then she is in fact in possession of a ground 
for her judgement, and this is exactly what is needed […] to know that the 
affirmed proposition is true” (Prawitz 2009, 199). In addition – Prawitz 
continues – although this is not necessary, “reflecting on the inference she 
has made the agent can prove that the inference is valid” (Idem). I think that 
if the agent did not know that the inference is valid, then we could not say 
that he really has a ground for the conclusion. For instance, someone may 
possess a ground for a certain proposition without being aware of the fact 
that it is indeed a ground for that proposition. (Think of a person who has 
made certain observations in the chemistry laboratory, but does not know for 
what propositions these observations may serve as grounds). Mutatis 
mutandis, a mathematician who infers a proposition by means of some 
inferences whose validity is unknown to him, cannot be considered justified 
in asserting the truth of that proposition, even though the proposition is in 
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fact true. This is why I think that the knowledge of the validity of the 
inference is a necessary condition for obtaining a justification for its 
conclusion. Therefore, if the stated conditions are satisfied, then valid 
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